1st Edition

Intuitions as Evidence

By Joel Pust Copyright 2000

    First published in 2000. Starting with Kripke's quotation on intuitive content being philosophic evidence, in this essay, the author aims to demonstrate how contemporary philosophy relies on intuitions as evidence, to explain what intuitions are and show why certain contemporary arguments against the use of intuitions as evidence fail.

    Introduction; Chapter 1: The Use of Intuitions as Evidence in Philosophy; Chapter 2: The Nature of Philosophical Intuitions; Chapter 3: Empiricist Explanationist Skepticism About Intuitions; Chapter 4: Problems with the Empiricist Skeptical Argument; Chapter 5: Reliability, Epistemic Circularity, and the Undue Partially of Empiricist Skepticism About Intuitions; References; Index

    Biography

    Joel Pust is at the University of Delaware.